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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Forward 
The purpose of the communication subsystem for Distributed 
Interactive simulation (DIS) is to provide an appropriate 
interconnected environment for effective integration of locally and 
global ly distributed simulation entities . There are many diverse 
aspects of this integration, ranging from the nature of the 
entities represented within the common simulated environment, to 
the common communication interface used for receiving packets of 
information from other simulators . The standard addressed by th'is 
Rationale Document is concerned only with the necessary 
communication system standards which must be accepted and adopted 
for supporting the integrated framework. 
The Protocol Data Units (POUs) defined in the DIS Standard are the 
Illingua franca II by which any t wo simulators or simulation sites can 
communicate . This includes simulators of different and unrelated 
design and architecture . No restriction is placed on what the 
participating simulator or site is, only on the way it communicates 
with the outside world. 
Where the DIS POUs define the information passed between simulators 
and simulation sites, this standard will define how those 
simulators, simulation sites, and other DIS entities can be 
connected in a modular fashion to facilitate the communication a t 
the local and global levels. This will be done through the 
required use of communications standards which promote 
interoperability, such as the International Organization for 
Standardization (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) reference 
model and the Government OSI Profile (GOSIP) . 
This standard describes the communication architecture subsystem 
that will support DIS exercises and activities . The DIS POU 
standard describes the format of the application protocol data 
units that contain the entity, environment, and simulation 
management information that will be carried on the n etwork. This 
standard describes the structure and use of the network to carry 
that information . The rationale document describes the rational 
behind the requirements a nd specifications in the communication 
architecture standard . This guidance/issues document describes how 
to use the information in the standard and rationale to create a 
communication subsystem to support DIS activity by providing 
tutorial descriptions and sample prototypes as well as discussing 
unresolved DIS communication architecture issues . 
1.2 Background 
The current work on standards began in August 1989 with the First 
Workshop on standards for the Interoperability of Defense 
Simulations . Using the work of SIMNET as a baseline and 
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considering recommendations made in workshop meetings and position 
papers, 1ST developed a first draft for a military standard which 
describes the form and types of messages to be exchanged between 
simul ated entities in a Distributed Interactive Simulation. The 
workshops also provided for discussion in other areas associated 
with DIS such as environment , fidelity and exercise control and 
feedback, and communication architecture and security . Through the 
meetings of the workshops, based on discussions and individual 
input , the first draft of the COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR 
DISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION (CADIS) military standard has 
been developed. This guidance document addresses this first draft 
of the communication architecture/security standard. 
1.3 Scope 
This document contains information on guidance and issues 
surrounding the key items that have become part of the draft 
military standard entitled COMMUNICATION ARCHITECTURE FOR 
PISTRIBUTED INTERACTIVE SIMULATION. This guidance/issues document 
is intended to give the system designer a better understanding of 
how to implement different components of the communication 
architecture , guidance for that implementation through sample 
prototypes, and what questions are still surrounding various 
aspects of the communication architecture. The communication 
architecture defined in the above mentioned draft military standard 
encompasses layers 1 through 5 of International Organization for 
Standardization I s (ISO) Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) 
Reference Model (ISORM). 
1.3.1 Intended use 
The intended use for this guidance document is as follows : 
2 . 
a . To present issues 
ma~agement) that are 
architecture specified 
appear in position 
recommendations . 
(interoperability, security , 
related to the communication 
for DIS applications as they 
papers and working group 
b. To recommend practices for the design and implementation 
of a communication architecture for DIS applications. 
COMMUNICATION FEATURES I SERVICES 
2.1 Communications Models 
One of the important tasks facing the DIS standards community is 
determining the services DIS requires from the communication 
systems implementation of a simul ator. For such a determination 
to take place, certain terms and classes of service must be defined 
and the advantages and/or limitations of each class of service must 
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be described. The goal of this section is to provide a high-level 
view of the different services under consideration for DIS . 
connectionless service allows each message to be treated 
independently . Subsequent messages between the same endpoints 
might require additional setup overhead (though some 
implementations try to maintain state and alleviate this drawback) . 
UDP provides connectionless service . Connection- oriented service 
requires an explicit setup procedure for each connection . Such a 
connection can later be used with little management overhead by 
referencing its name. Tep provides connection- oriented service 
(from a little management overhead by referencing its name. TCP 
provides connection-oriented service (from a user perspective at 
least) . More formally a connection is a persistent , named 
association of endpoints and communications resources . 
For correct network operation, this name must be unique across a 
communications network at anyone point in time. The term 
"connection" is used in reference both to the l ogical endpoint 
association and to the association ' s physical realization in 
network state and topology . An active (or " open " ) connection is on 
which has undergone initial setup and whose name has been 
specified . Deactiva ting (or " closing " a connection dissolves the 
association of endpoints and releases the connection ' s resources . 
The process of associating an endpoint with a connection is called 
adding the endpoint into the connection . There are two kinds of 
adding: a join begins with a request from the endpoint to the 
connection, and an invite begins with a request from the connection 
to the endpoint . A command from a connection c to disassociate an 
endpoint from C drops the endpoint from C; if the endpoint requests 
to be disassociated from the connection, the endpoint leaves C. 
An example network which is referenced in the following discussion 
is shown in Figure 1, along with a very "generic " connection. The 
network consists of nine simulators at four sites . Bold lines 
indicate links which are associated with the connection . Arrows 
indicate a direction of data flow : numbers adjacent to arrows 
indicate some arbitrary measure of necessary resources 
( "bandwidth") . The connection shows eight participant simulators , 
each with different transmit and receive resource requirements. 
Note that simUlator b is receive- only. The bidirectional sum of 
nece ssary resources for a connection is identical for all 
associated links , and is equal to the sum of the transmit resources 
of all associated endpoints. 
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Figure 1. Example Network with Generic Connection 
2 . 1 .1 . Number of Endpoints in a Connection. 
connections are often characterized by the number of e ndpo ints with 
which they a r e associated . Perhaps the mos t common connection i s 
between two endpoints . This is referred to as unicast . Two 
unicast connections a r e shown in Figure 2 . The connection between 
b and d is two-way unicast , since both transmit: the connection 
between q and h i s one - way u nicast , since only q transmits . These 
terms should not be confused with full - duplex and h a lf- duplex . 
Duplex refers to the ability of a communications link to carry 
messages simultaneous ly in both directions: ful l - duplex can , ha l f -
duplex cannot . One c an still configure a two- way unicast 
connection over a half - duplex link; the transmitters must simply 
t ake t urns using that link . 
10 
,,' 10 J) 
Figure 2. Unicast Connections 
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connections between a subset of all possible endpoints are 
multicast . Figure 3 illustrates two multicast connections. The 
left- hand c onnec tion is rnany- to-many , since all endpoints transmit. 
The right- hand connection is one - to-many , since only f t ransmits . 
5 
20 
/ 
Figure 3 . Multicast Connections 
When all possible endpoints are associated with a connection , the 
connection is broadcast . A one-to- all broadcast connection is 
presented in Figure 4; only e is transmitting. If a ll endpoints 
we re transmitting , the broadcast would be all-to- a ll . 
10 
e 
Figur e 4. Broadcast connection 
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It should be noted that both unicast and broadcast a re special 
cases of mUlticast . Since it is rare ly the case that al l endpoints 
attached to a network are associated with a connection (in general , 
only ne t work management functions might require broadcast), most 
DIS c onnections are multicast , with a few unicast connections. 
2 . 1 . 2 Connection Resource Allocation . 
The r esources (and endpoints , since they r equire r esources ) 
allocated to a persistent connection can be static, or fixed , at 
the t ime o f connection activat ion , or they can be dynamic, 
changeable during the life of the connection . Static vs. dynamic 
r esour ce al l ocat i on has implications with respect to : 
• connection control/ownership, 
• communications link routing, and 
• bandwidth allocation . 
Protocols exist where some of these three properties are static , 
while others are dynamic . 
The "owning , II or controlling, endpoint of a connection is quite 
important for most p r otocols . The owner may do severa l things : 
direct which other endpoint s join or leave the connection, specify 
the r esources r equested for the connection, receive the bill f or 
the connection , and usually r eceives a designation within the name 
o f the connection. with such singl e - owner protocols, if the owner 
e ndpoint fails or needs to leave the connection , the entire 
connection might be deactivated. Some protocols a l low for s uch 
occurrences by providing a mechanism f or ownersh i p " h andoff " t o 
a nother endpoint in the connection. 
Al though routing and bandwidth allocation are strongly coupled , 
mos t protocol implementations make routing the less flexible 
resource, once established. Dynamic adding of new endpoints into 
a connection c a n ma ke bandwidth demands which invalidate previous 
routing decisions : a link which can support five endpoints might 
not support t en endpoints. If a protocol is not capabl e of re-
routing under such circumstances, it can not guarantee service t o 
added endpoints without worst - case bandwidth a llocation at the t ime 
of connection act ivation . 
2.1.3 Per - Message Reliabi l ity . 
A reliable connection provides a mechanism to guarantee that each 
message i s delivered and delivered i ntact . Protocols supporting 
such connections require some form of acknowl edgement and 
retransmission facility . Unreliable connections make no de livery 
guarantees . 
Reliable p r otocols are well - understood for unicast 
Mechanisms for reliable roul ticast do not exist . 
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incurred by a reliable multicast transmitter while processing the 
acknowledgement/retransmission data for all receiving endpoints can 
be unacceptably high. Furthermore f the defini ticn of "all 
receiving endpoints" is a problem for connections which allow 
dynamic adding and leaving of endpoints. How does a n endpoint 
acquire a list of the other endpoints in a connection , then 
maintain that l ist up- to- date? A related and similarl y handled 
problem, that of determin ing whether or not a connection is active , 
is discussed in more de t ai l in the next subsection . 
2 . 1.4 Associating Endpoints with Multicast Connections. 
Let us begin with the fundamental question "How does a new endpoint 
n become associated with a connection C? " The endpoint might be 
associated for the duration of an exercise , or for only a short 
portion of an exercise. The endpoint might need to be associ ated 
just with C, or with C along with several other connections related 
to C. Our question is tied to several issues: 
Given 
three 
• ownership of connections , 
• what happens to a connection when the Blast " endpoint 
leaves, and 
• sets of related connections. 
the operations defined previously in this section , there are 
ways for n to become associated with C: 
1) n can be invited into C by some endpoint e already in C, 
2) n can join c , or 
3) n can activate C. 
The first possibility assumes that some endpoint e in C knows that 
n should be invited into C. This ass umption is valid for 
connections with a static set of endpoints, but not for connections 
with endpoints dynamically joining. The other two possibilities 
are alternat ives depending on whether or not C is active . Actions 
take place based on that knowledge : the answer to the query " Is C 
active? " cannot change between the time n poses the query and acts 
on the result. Some means must exist to assure that C should not 
be deactivated or will not be activated by some other endpoint . 
The query is but one phase of a full - fledg ed distributed database 
transaction. 
In order to determine if C is active, n must route to some 
information base with knowledge about C. A multicast connection 
associates a set of endpoints, not just two. As such , it is not 
always the best choice to name a connection by distinguishing one 
endpoint (which would usually be the owner) . The obvious 
information base with knowledge about C is some endpoint already in 
C. If no such endpoint is identified through the connection name , 
how can n get data about C? 
7 
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Three approaches can resolve this situation : 
1) 
2) 
3) 
c is always active a nd a route to it is well-known . 
Some well - known endpoint always knows if C is active . 
All endpoints can be queried to determine if C is active. 
If C is always active , n must still be able to route to it for a 
joi n t o t ake p l ace . The most common example of this a rrangement is 
that messages in c are actually a " filtered " subset of t he messages 
of some gener al , statical ly- active connection G. "Joining" C 
simpl y means that nl s G- f i l t er is modified to accept anot her type 
of message. . 
Approach 2 implies the existence of a database server with global 
knowl edge of a ll active connections and some mean s to route to 
them . One logical choice for this is a statically- act i ve Gl oba l 
Exercise Manager , about which all joining endpoints would have 
en ough data so that they could r oute to and query it. 
Both approaches 1 and 2 a llow c to remain active across points in 
time when , temporarily , no p l atform- simulation endpoints a r e 
associated wi t h C. For approach 1 , G is active i ndependently of C. 
For approach 2 , if the database server or some other stat ically-
added endpoint owns the connection , it logically act s as "the last 
endpoint II from a protocol point of view. 
Approach 3 requires a query of all possible endpoints which might 
be associated with or own C. First, this implies broadcast, at 
least within the scope of all possible---not just current-OIS 
exercise part icipants . second, and more important , is t he 
transaction nature of associating n with C. C shoul d not 
deactivate while n is attempting to join it , but some other 
endpoint must not activate C while n is trying to activate C. This 
is a classic "distributed consensus" or "distributed snapshot II 
prob l em . Algorithms to resolve such problems are known, but are 
complex and cannot be impl emented across even l ocal area networks 
wi thin the real - time latency limits identified by CASS o This 
approach is thus of questionable merit for connections requir ing 
dynamic joining and/or leaving of endpoints. 
Back to the original list of issues above, the final issue concerns 
sets of II related" connections . For instance , n might need to join 
connect ions C, D, E, and F . A very dynamic example of this need 
arises from the I1 segmented battlefield" concept for defining 
multicast connections as representing geographic areas. Targeting 
handoff coul d bring severa l areas , and thus connections , into a 
platform ' s field of interest simultaneously. High-range sensors 
might deal best with much larger segments of geographic area than 
do short- range sensors, l est they be required to l isten to 
literally hundreds of connections at once. Both real - time 
mul tiple - connection joining and hierarchial connections are most 
easily implemented with a message- filter approach . 
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2.1 . 5 Multicast Resource Allocation and Routing Policy . 
Protocols which implement multicast connections generally handle 
the case of roul tip!e transrni tters in one of two ways. These 
approaches are: 
• Allocate resources for the connection as a whole . 
• Allocate resources on a per- transmitter basis . 
These t wo approaches can be effectively the same for connections 
with a static set of endpoints; they might exhibit tradeoffs only 
for connections which support dynamic adding and l eaving of 
endpoints . 
Protocols which treat a connection as a whole can route and 
allocate resources more rapidly than those which independently 
route and allocate for each transmitter . Potential disadvantages , 
however, begin to be apparent when one starts adding endpoints . 
Either sUfficient " worst case" bandwidth must have been allocated 
to the connection at activation time , or additional bandwidth must 
be al l ocated for the new transmitters . This brings u p the 
possibility of forcing a re-route or refusing service to the new 
endpoints. 
Those whole- connection protocols which support route 
reconfiguration per transmitter can avoid service refusal in this 
case . Even those which can re-route do not necessarily establi s h 
an optima l route. Whole - connection allocation generally over-
allocates bidirectional bandwidth on internal network links. 
Whereas , in the optimal state, the sum of bandwidth in both 
directions along a link equals the total transmitter bandwidth , 
whol e-connection allocation is usually defined so that the 
bandwidth in each direct ion is set to the t otal transmitter 
bandwidth . Requested, and thus billed, bandwidth is twice the 
optimal requirement . Due to such bandwidth over- allocation and due 
to routing all transmitters through the same links , routes are 
theoretically harder to find through conges ted networks. 
Protocols which always allocate and route per- transmitter can 
allocate bandwidth exactly , and can more easily route around 
network congestion points . Connection management for adding and 
leaving endpoints is much more difficult. Messages for the " same ll 
connection can corne in from different links. Processing and 
hardware overhead exist for maintaining and merging the different 
physical connections into one logical connection . Each incoming 
link can exhibit different latency properties, so messages from 
different simulators at the same site can arrive at quite different 
times . Whenever an endpoint n joins in or leaves , all other 
endpoints in the connection must be upda ted to connect to or 
disconnect from n . For a connection c, this is a distributed 
transaction proble m of similar complexity to the " is C active? " 
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query, but requires processing by all endpoints in C , not just by 
C ' s owner or some database server . 
As a distributed transaction, the add/leave problem is amenable to 
either a database server or distributed snapshot solution. 
Complex, protocol - specific endpoint management appears to be 
outside the scope of CASS ' task and against the !l open architecture" 
premise of DIS . Protocols which do not perform multi - transmitter 
endpoint management thernsel ves are thus not sui table for 
connections requiring dynamic adding and l eaving of endpoints ; 
however , these protocols are suitable for connections whose 
endpoints are statically determined . 
The issue of efficiency in per- transmitter bandwidth allocation and 
routing does not exist if service must be guaranteed for the full 
duration of an exercise. For an endpoint not to be refused a join 
into a connection, bandwidth for that endpoint must be available. 
This can not be guaranteed unless sufficient bandwidth for all 
potential endpoints is reserved at the time of exercise setup (as 
is the case for leased lines , but not necessarily for commercial 
service where other users are also on the network) . If worst- case 
resources must be pre-allocated, per- transmitter allocation 
provides no savings. 
2 . 2 Grouping of POUs 
Non-contention digital communications systems operate most 
efficiently (i . e. have the greatest throughput) when the packets 
that they handle are at or near the basic maximum l ength for which 
they were designed (e . g . 4352 octets for FOOl). This is due to the 
fact that overhead portions of the packet are of constant length 
and the processing time for each packet is fairly constant . 
Therefor the ratio of user data to overhead increases as the length 
of packet increases. If, however, message l ength becomes greater 
than the basic maximum packet length, the communicat i ons system 
must break the message up into smaller units. Such activity. 
increases overhead and reduces efficiency. 
The POUs defined in the DIS program are relatively small compared 
to the maximum data area of a typical packet . (W ith frame size for 
IP=20, UDP=8, and TCP=20 , Ethernet data area for DIS PDUs is 1472 
octets long for UDP+IP and 1460 octets long fo r TCP+IP.) If each 
POU is sent via a separate packet, the overhead ratio would be high 
and the throughput would be limited. One method of improving the 
situation is to pack multiple POUs into a single communications 
packet . To this end, we recommend that : 
1 . A single platform simulator should group all the POUs 
generated by a single iteration of its mode l(s) into packets . 
This may result in entity state, emissions , fire, and voice 
POUs in a singl e packet. However, POUs should not be 
"collected " from iteration to iteration of the models just to 
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make communications more efficient. 
excessive delays between the time the 
time it is sent. 
To do so would create 
PDU is created and the 
2. A Computer Generated Force 
entity state (and other 
communications packet . 
(CGF) unit 
POUs) as 
should group as many 
possible into each 
3. A gateway or router should consolidate those PDUs arriving 
within a short time interval (e . g . 10 to 20 milliseconds) into 
maximum sized .communications packets. 
concatenating moderately sized POUs within LANs is likely to 
improve bandwidth utilization at a cost in increased latency. One 
negative impact of concatenation on latency is the increased 
processing time required to examine queues for pending transmittals 
with the same destination . with a frame size limit of 1500 octets, 
Etherne t LANs are poor candidates for concatenation of moderately 
sized DIS POUs. While the frame size in FOOl is considerably 
larger (4352 octets) and is fixed length, its transmission rate is 
an order of magnitude greater than Ethernet . Thus , the token 
holding period expires quickly and the node can easily lose its 
transmission window while trying to pack additional PDUs into the 
frame . A second negative i mpact on latency comes from the increase 
probability of collisions in a contention environment (e.g. 
Ethernet, packet radio) -- increased packet size results in a greater 
probability that some portion of the packet will collide with 
another packet. 
It is in long haul networks where the benefits of concatenation 
usually outweigh the cost. Encryption overhead is applied to each 
packet regardless of size . Each router/gateway connects to a 
dedicated link resulting in generally more limited bandwidth (a Tl 
provides from 0 . 1 to 0.01 the bandwidth of the LANs it connects); 
latency issues may become secondary to efficient use of bandwidth. 
It should also be noted that the LAN(S) a t either end of the 
gateway will have already filtered out packets with destinations 
that they can handle, so the gateway parses a more limited subset 
of destinations . 
It is most important to remember that all PDUs put into the same 
communications packet will be sent to the same destination. 
Therefore, POUs with different destinations should never be put 
into the same packet. 
The maximum number of octets available for POUs as viewed from 
layer seven (application) is a function of the maximum packet size 
of the transport med ium used (e.g. Ethernet), less the overhead 
(packet headers and trailers) used by the intervening layers. 
The packing of multiple POUs into communications packets must be 
done at the application layer, for there is no provision for doing 
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so in the COTS protocol suites defined for phases 0,1 o r 2 . The 
mechanism f o r packing POUs is left to the developer of the 
application layer software . We do recommend tha t this function be 
provided in third party Network Interface Units (NIU) being 
developed for the DIS market . 
There is no mechanism specif ied as to how the POUs are to be pa cked 
(the y a re simply concate nated in a buf f e r) and there is no 
indication in the communications packet that it contains multiple 
PDUs . A recommendation for a concatenation POU to make the 
situation explicit h as floated around the DIS c ommunity for some 
time but it has been determined to be a perogative of each LAN and 
LAN g a t e way. For this reason we strongly recommend that the input 
processing softwa re (commerc i al NIUs included) assume that there 
are multiple PDUs in each received packet . 
Multiple 
Phase O. 
POUs shou ld be c oncatenated into a single UDP datagram 
No extra framing or encapsulat i o n is needed . 
2.3 Packet Length 
for 
Packet l e ngth in DIS will be largely determined by the specific POU 
l e ngth and r equired protocol headers. In general, the 
characteristics of the architecture will determine whether 
extremely large POUs o r moderately sized POUs (500 to 1000 octets) 
are optimal. Small PDUs (less than 100 octets) are neve r optimal 
simply because t he ratio o f header overh ead to use r data is 
excessive (e.g . 54 additional octets in t he case of a n B02.3/IP/UDP 
LAN) • 
For Phase 0 , the IP data portion of a packet can , in theory, be up 
to 64 K octets . However , transmitting POUs i n excess of 1500 octets 
is a less eff i cient use of bandwidth and processor capacity for 
Ethernet LANs. 
2.3 .1 Fragmentation 
At least one DIS POU has a lready been defined to exceed some LAN 
limits (in the worst case , the variable length Emitter POU may b e 
9632 octet s , see section 4.1 . 1). This would require fragmentation 
in some LANs . Since all IP implementations are required to support 
reassembly but not fragmentation (see RFC 1122), any host IP 
i mplementation to be used by DIS should be required t o support both 
fragmentation and reassembly , with a maximum reassembled datagram 
size of a t least 1 0000 octets, and preferably unlimited. The size 
of the individua l fragments, before reassembly , will v ary a ccording 
to the limits on the various LANs and WANs in the path that a PDU 
takes . Many popular IP implementations refuse to broadcast (or 
multicast) packets that require fr agmentation ; the abi l ity to 
broadcast and mUlticas t fragment e d d a t agrams should be r equ ired for 
any fragmentation implementation on the local network. 
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2.4 Bandwidth Reservation / Guarantee 
The need for a reservations service is tied directly to the offered 
load of the network in relation to peak utilization. In an 
undersubscribed network, the need for a reservations service is 
negligible : in a heavily oversubscribed network , the need for 
reservations may be substantial, but the cost wil l also be 
substantial . For DIS configurations, as is typical of many large 
networks , the need for reservations will increase with increased 
distance, number of links and number LANs . To ensure the 
availability of capacity for exercises involving longhaul, it will 
be necessary to support a reservation service by Phase 1 of DIS. 
In an oversubscribed network with both reservations and demand 
assigned, a reservations strategy will either require that: 
1. the reservation can force the clear down of non-reservation 
allocations to obta i n the necessa ry end- to- end capacity; 
2 . the reservation can negotiate with LAN Managers to impose flow 
control, in a manner that restricts flow on the non-
reservations allocations up to the point that the reservations 
connections c an be satisfied; 
3. the reservation can wait for currently allocated bandwidth to 
be released; this strategy is most satisfactory when there are 
traffic statistics .... 'hich can be used to estimate the amount of 
time prior to a reservation that allocations must be blocked 
(unavailable to any requester other than the reservation) to 
ensure that capacity is available at the start time of the 
reservation. 
A quick assessment of the above strategies will show that strategy 
1 is really the only "Guaranteed " allocation , and is both brutal 
and simple. strategy 2 results in degraded (but not interrupted) 
service for the non- reservations subscriber . It is a n elegant 
solution with a hint of danger (lacks robustness) . Finally, 
strategy 3 is the classic solution for circuit switched cornmon 
carrier networks that also offer premium services (e.g. video 
teleconferencing) . Given extremely large capacity networks of 
demand assigned subscribers and a small percentage of r eservations 
SUbscribers , Strategy 3 is almost guaranteed. It is also the most 
wasteful, in terms of unused and unavailable bandwidth and requires 
a very centra lized , statistically based implementation. Thus , 
strategy 1 is recommended for DIS. 
2 .4.1 Method of Allocation 
A reservations strategy is similar to a priority scheme . For 
allocations involving multiple physical links over multiple 
subnets, the best point at which to process reservation control 
messages is in the transport layer . Defined- in the OS1 Transport 
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Layer Service Definition , is the Quality of Service (QOS) parameter 
list . One of the QOS control paramet ers is II priority "; it is 
recommended that this fie ld b e made available to a rese rvation 
service . An associated parameter is ., throughput " which is further 
subdivided into dire ctional and measured (vs . allocated) 
throughput. Coupled with each priority designation , the n , would be 
the allocated throughput . 
For Phase 0 , the IP TOS fi e ld can be used . This field includes 
f l ags which request l ow delay , high throughput , high reliability, 
or low cost (no combinations are allowed) , as well as a three- bit 
priority field . 
2 . 4.2 start Time and Duration 
Reservations are explicitly part of an exercise . At some 
appropriate interval prior to the reservation 1 s desired start time, 
connections will be requested for the participating nodes (hosts). 
An upper limit must be placed on the total capacity availab l e for 
r eservations . In a t oken bus or token ring network with no dema nd 
assigned (non- reserved allocations) , it may be possible to set this 
threshold a t 90% capacity; however, in a mixed network with one o r 
more contention subnets (e . g . ALOHA , CSMA/CD), the threshold may b e 
anywhere from 1 8% to 50% of t otal capacity in the subnet. 
2.4 . 3 congestion control 
The triggering of congestion control should be infrequent in Phase 
1 or 2 of DIS , since mos t allocations will be connection-oriented. 
Nonetheless, equipment failure and the mixing of processors and 
communications links of wide ly varying capacities will necessitate 
a congest ion control mechanism. Nodes with reservation should 
honor choke messages ; however, centrally issued choke messages 
(e . g . LAN node controller) should be ordered such that non-
r eservations connections to the congested node are sent choke 
packets before reservations connections . If a congested node or 
gateway is the transmitter of choke packets , it should thrott l e 
non- reservations connections before r eservations connections . 
2.4.4 Flow Control and Alternate Path Routing 
Reservation a llocations shoul d not be decreased by i mpos ing flow 
control . Conversely , a reservation should not be allowed t o 
increase its allocation after initialization by us ing flow control 
requests. 
A reservation impl ies a static environment with connectivity 
completed a t initialization . However , if there is a problem at a 
gateway or along a l ong haul path , and if alternate paths exist 
with sufficient capacity f o r t he r eservation, the reservation may 
be dynamically routed to the alternate path. 
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2 . 4.5 Contiguous Allocations 
For some non-digitized video, audio and sensor transmissions, it is 
not possible to incur delays between packets without a noticeable 
breakup on the receive side. For that reason, one of the poss ible 
uses of reservations will be to allocate a connection as contiguous 
bandwidth in blocks of 32 kbps, 64 kbps, 384 kbps , etc. Such 
allocations require access to the node ' s station management 
functions (at the MAC and PHY layers) using the MIB (Management 
Information Base) at these layers as well as the transport/network 
layer MIB. Node - to-node control is initiated using SNMP messages. 
It may be necessary to force reduced traffic loading (via flow 
control messages) on contention LANs or WANs , if these long 
sequences of frames are to avoid collisions. Use of flow control 
packets in this case would be 'restricted to reservations 
initialization and to contention type subnets . 
2.4.6 Problems with Concurrent Reservation Initialization 
While a r eservation 
LANs should inhibit 
This avoids dual 
deadlocks. 
is being initialized on one LAN, all the other 
any reservations implementation of their own . 
seizure conditions and partial al l ocation 
Two or more LANs establishing connections concurrently for two or 
more reservations with similar start times may result in partial 
and incomplete allocations . For example , if along LinkA only 500 
kbps is available and within LinkB only 400 kbps is available and 
both LANl and LAN2 need 300 kbps on LinkA and LinkB to satisfy the 
two different reservations, the following could occur if concurrent 
reservation initialization is allowed: 
LANl alloca tes and holds 300 kbps a long LinkA and LAN2 
allocates and holds 300 kbps along LinkS. Now each LAN 
attempts to complete the reservation but both find that there 
is inSUfficient capacity available at the other link they 
need. Neither can satisfy their reservation so both 
reservations are denied . 
In fact , one of the reservations could have been satisfied if LANl 
had been allowed to allocate a complete reservation before LA.N2 
initialized its reservation request . 
Two or more LANs establishing a connection concurrently for two or 
more reservations may also result in a blockage referred to as a 
dual seizure. For example , LANl begins establishing a connection 
by allocating the remaining capacity from point A to B to C to D. 
At the same time, LAN 2 attempts to establish a connection from 
point D to C to B to A. Both reach an impasse at the B/C boundary 
coming from opposite directions. One must back off to let the 
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other complete the connection . This problem is easily avoided if 
concurrent reservation initialization is prohibited. 
2 . 4 . 7 Advance Reservation Logging 
LANs should provide 
advance. This allows 
a service which stores 
two important features to 
a reservation in 
be implemented: 
1. Negotiation rathe r than denial--The LAN can implement a 
dialogue which' examines alternative capacity , start time, 
duration and node connectivity values with the requester , if 
the original rese.rvation request is likely to be denied. 
2 . Efficient use of capacity--Advance Reservations can result in 
capacity utilization which approaches the efficiency of token 
ring or TOM strategies rather than that of contention 
techniques. 
The above, 
reservations 
a first - come 
of course, assumes the re is no 
override option and that reservations 
first - served basis. 
3. ARCHITECTURE 
3 . 1 Topology and Components 
priority- based 
are honored on 
The basic job of the communication subsystem is to provide an 
application interface for the DIS protocol with interconnection 
between each of the participating simulation and simulation support 
entities. The environment is heterogeneous , multi - vendor , multiple 
developers, and multiple owning or operating agencies . 
Heterogeneity extends not only to the collection of participating 
hosts , but also to the variety of communication medium, various 
operating systems, and various languages for software development . 
The diagram in Figure 5, illustrates the communications subsystem 
as a protocol stack of seven layers. The DIS PDUs are application 
messages which connect with the Application Programs . The 
applications contain entities, environmental objects and other 
objects such as simulation support services. 
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Figure 5 : Communications Subsystem Architecture 
Various types of communication facilities can be used to form the 
virtual network as illustrated in Figure 6. The communications 
medium, at the lowest level, include wire, fiber - optic , satellite , 
micro- wave, e t c . These medium may be used interchangeably , as 
p e rformance characteristics permit. Communication services should 
be independent of t he means of communication, to the maximum extent 
possible . Figure 5 also i llustrates that a pplications include 
manned battlefield simulators , Computer Generated Forces and real 
instrumented platforms. A Cell is a homogenous set of simulators 
which can be distributed in a variety of ways . Cell Adapter Units 
(CAUs) interface between non- DI S compliant applications a nd the DIS 
protocol. Hosts are defined by interfaces with the network . 
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Various types of communication are needed to support a distributed 
simulation environment. These currently include control, data, 
voice , real time, non-real time , and will likely be augmented in 
the future to include such things video and other forms of 
pictorial information . It is desirable from a usage and 
communication management perspective for these various forms of 
traffic to share communications faci lities , instead of h aving 
different and disjoint f acilities for each type of communica tion. 
Man-in-the-loop simulator based training and experimenta tion are 
the domains of interest . Thus , a l owe r performance bound is set by 
certain interactions which must proceed at human reaction r a t es 
which reflect the situation being simulated . 
It is anticipated that multiple, simultaneous , independent training 
sessions will take p l ace even on a single instance o f a DIS 
faci lity . Therefore, mechanisms must be provided to ensure t he 
separat ion and non- interference of these potentia l ly conflicting 
activities . Similarly, there i s a need for including some 
simulation components whose oper ating characteristics a r e 
classified . Mechanisms are required to ensure the separation of 
secure and non-secure par ts of a simulation activity . In lie u of 
such mechanisms , entire simulation exercises mus t be i nsecure or 
secure at the same level . 
The network design issues are naming , addressing , routing, fl ow 
control and congestion control . Real t ime , low lat ency traffic and 
non- real time t raffic wi ll have different requirements / tolerance 
of the performance impact of flow control mechanisms . 
3 . 1.1 Naming 
Communication functions include a means for naming the entities 
participating in the communication . Naming func t ions are distinct 
and separable from addressing functions, which help to route 
messages to their proper (named) destination. Addressing functions 
are most often associated with an architecture or commun ication 
system design , while naming is often more rel ated to the 
application of t he communication . For simulation , names need to be 
assigned not only to hosts, but to simulated entities (and their 
parts) , and other services which populate the simulation 
environment . 
Flexibility in the nami ng of the communicating entities will 
support f l exibility and modulari t y in the application designs and 
implementations uti l izing the communication. Fl exible naming is one 
aspect of moving toward a more " object- oriented" system paradigm . 
Additionally, as the simulation environment gets more globa l and 
far reaching , it also gets more complex . This i ncreases the 
necessity to separate the relatively infrequently changing name 
structure from the relatively more frequently changing addr ess 
str ucture. Naming fu nctions also include group naming in support of 
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multicast operations. In DIS phase 0 , there is no specific name 
service r equired . 
3.1.2 Addressing 
Inter-entity communication in a distributed interactive simulation 
environment consists largely of packets sent between two or more of 
the simulation participants. Messages are exchanged largely within 
an individual exercise: however some management and control type of 
communication could span multiple exercises. Although it is n ot 
currently the case , certain "servers " which may be costly to 
replicate could service clients in multiple exercise 
simultaneously . 
Addresses exist at each level of the ISO model . At l evel 7, the 
entities a re addr essed . An entity contains three fields: Entity ID , 
site and host. The Entity 10 is an unique address for the exercise. 
Entities can fire weapons as l1 events". These events exist in an 
address space relative to the originating entity . The Site is one 
int erface on the Wide Area Network. The host is the simulator or 
computer Generated Forces computer. Cel l s and exercises define 
g roups of entities , but they do not have a network address . In the 
future , it is likely that entities could migrate between hosts or 
even between sites. This means that the Layer 7 address should be 
kept separate from any lower layer address . 
The distributed simulation environment has a r equirement for 
multiple I-to-many interactions to maintain a shared notion of 
system state. These types of interactions (frequently referred to 
as multicast) deliver identical POUs to multiple recipients, as 
part of a single operation on the part of the sender. In some 
cases, the "many " is a large group , typically all entities 
participating in a particular exercise (e.g . the ent i t y state POU). 
Many of these participants will be both sources and sinks of 
multicast activity. 
Current implementations of multicast addresses occur a t Layers 2, 
3 and 4. At layer 2 the Local Area Network, IEEE 802 .2, standard 
multicast addressing is used . The network layer multicast address , 
i .e., Internet Protocol in Phase 0 , is used to map i nto the link 
l ayer address at Layer 2. The Internet Activities Board 
administrate the internet address space . Multicast addressing have 
already been allocated for special needs. For the DIS protocol , the 
network l ayer multicast is allocated to the Exercise 10 and the 
Protocol Version number. The Layer 4 protoco l provides the 
transport service . The address is the port TO. Additional multicast 
addressing can occur for ports. The DIS protoco l is mapped into one 
preassigned port 10 for the User Datagram Protocol in Phase O. 
Tn some cases the group associated with the multicast may be 
dynamic , with entities coming and going during the course of an 
exer cise . In other cases, the groups may be s t atic and setup prior 
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to the execution of the e xercise . It is anticipated (based on 
current experience) that a large number of multicast groups will 
eventually be needed. 
3 . 1.3 Routing 
Routing is performed by the gateway system . The gateway routing 
minimizes the number of "hops " to reduce latency , and rout es 
multicast addressed PDUs to their destinations. The gateways can 
choose, independent from the DIS application , to use a connection-
oriented or a connectionless protocol . In the connection- oriented 
approach, virtual circuits are established between the source site 
and all destination sites in the exercise . POUs are then copied on 
each virtual circuit. The gateway effectively operate as a virtual 
Bridge. 
In the connectionless approach, gateways route POU l s to minimize 
the number of hops . A desired property for the connectionless 
approach in DIS is that it also minimize the number of packet 
copies. Example protocols are the Internet Activity Boards 
Multicast OSPF and ST- II . 
3.1.4 Flow Control 
The flow control objective is the need to sustain real time 
operating speeds . Applications for training and eva l uation 
purposes, which include manned simulations, need to keep pace with 
the rea l world entities they model , and with human reaction time. 
Our concern here is on the impact of inter-entity communication 
performance on network performance . Highe r performance networks 
make more interactions per unit time feasible, and better 
compression techniques (e . g. dead reckoning , which compresses the 
number of messages needed, not the content of a message) make fewer 
interactions per unit time possible. 
When we introduce "voice" data message s to the mix of traffic, 
another dimension of flow control becomes important . To be able to 
collect together and replay continuous voice messages , the 
inte r-message di spersion in time of the individual parts cannot be 
degraded very much . CUrrent experience in this area suggests that 
an initial target for effective communication of continuous speech 
is inter- message dispersion of less than 50 milliseconds . 
3.1 . 4 . 1 Error Control 
Section 2.1.3 ide ntifies PDUs which shall be delivered reliably. 
This means that each of those PDUs shall be delivered to its 
destination without error . Implied in this definition is that the 
receipt of each PDU shall be acknowledged and retransmitted if 
necessary. Such acknowledgement and r etransmission will be handled 
by the error detection/correction mechanism of the protocols used 
at level 4 and below . That is, there is no action required at the 
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application level other than to indicate that a particular POU is 
to be sent reliably. The receiving application can assume t hat all 
POUs sent reliably are in order and intact. 
PDUs not requiring reliable delivery shall be given best effort 
de l ivery . These PDUs make up the bulk of network traffic and 
include those POUs that are multicast to all simulators i n a DIS 
exercise. The acknowledgement and retransmission associated with 
reliabl e delivery , is not feasible due to the additional latency 
and network bandwidth that would be required . There is also the . 
possibility that a PDU with corrupted data may be received . . The 
processing of such corrupted data may create unacceptable behavior 
in the receiving simulator. To prevent t his, the DIS 
communications architecture shall include in its best effort 
del ivery a checksum mechanism. Because this type of checksum is 
specific to DIS , its location in the protocol stack has not been 
defined. This checksum shall include the entire PDU . If a 
checksum error is detected in a received POU, the PDU shall be 
discarded by the communications software . That is , it shall not be 
made visible to the application. 
3 . 1 . 5 Congestion Control 
Congestion occurs when the demand is greater than the available 
resources . The problem of congestion is not solved as resources 
become less expensive, such as computers, or as higher speed 
networks become available, such as FOOl and the Gbit networks. For 
example, suppose the LAN in Figure 6 is an FOOl and the WAN is the 
Defense Simulation Internet (OSI) . The high speed LAN without 
proper congestion control can lead to r educed performance. with the 
high speed link, the arrival rate to the first gateway can become 
much higher than the departure rate , lead ing to long queues, buffer 
overflows, and packet losses that cause the latency and transfer 
time to increase. 
One solution is demand reduction schemes . A slow- down control 
packet, known as the " source quench " , is sent from the gateway to 
the source host . It is the host 1s responsibility to reduce the 
speed by l ocating the offending entities and reducing their 
activity . The host could change dead - reckoning thresholds, or 
decrease the number of entities . The scheme must be fair. If one 
simulator is favored over another, it is more difficult to assure 
a " fair fight ". 
Another solution is to use prioritized traffic, so that lower 
priority POUs are lost first in overflow situations . The quest ion 
is how to prioritize the POUs. The Entity state PDUs could be 
placed at a lower priority than other POUs because the 
dead- reckoning algorithms smooth the results . The problem is that 
there is a limit on how many lost Entity state PDUs can occur 
before visual cues such as jumps are noticed. Therefore, we do not 
recommend a priority scheme for congestion control. 
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For the phase 0 system, there are only two different speed links , 
the WAN and the LAN. The congestion control problem is handled 
using the source quench Internet Control Message Protocol (IeMP) 
packet . Designing a scheme that allows slower paths to be used 
depending upon the load levels on all paths is a topic for further 
study 
3 . 1 . 6 Interoperability with Non- DIS Systems 
There are three types of non- DIS systems to be considered : 
1 . previously stand- alone simulators 
2. higher- order models 
3 . live ranges and operational platforms 
Previously stand-alone simulators model the battlefiel d at the 
vehicle level . The differences in the simulator is in the computer 
Image Generator (erG) , the terrain map and how it manages automated 
entities . Interoperability involves mapping simulator events and 
state into the DIS protocol and generating an accurate terrain data 
base for the simulation assets. 
The higher- order models are interfaced through a computer Generated 
Forces (CGF) system. One of the benefits of translating these HOM ' s 
to DIS is the Plan View Display and Stealth capability of DIS. 
The simulation assets of a DIS system can be used to provide range 
participants with the infrastructure of a larger battlefield than 
that possible using field equipment at the range. Interoperability 
involves mapping the state of a Range Control Center , the location 
and velocity information and events from the various platforms. An 
accurate terrain database of the range is needed for the simulation 
assets . One trade- off to be considered in translating the range 
protocol into DIS is the ease with which entities can join and 
leave the exercise . A reduced sized entity state PDU can be used 
for the instrumentation service network. However , simulation 
management must establish the appropriate databases when an entity 
joins . 
There are many approaches to integrating a simulator into an 
integrated DIS exercise which fit within the framework outlined 
above. From an architectural point of view, the following list 
enumerates a variety of possible simulator organizations , al l of 
which are appropriate for meeting DIS interoperability 
requirements: 
a simulator and its DIS communication interface can coexist on 
a single host computer . 
a single host can run multiple simulations using the same or 
different DIS host identities for these entities . 
23 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
• a dedicated front end processor can be used for implementi ng 
the communication i nteroperability (as well as other DIS) 
requirements for one or more back end simul ators . This 
approach i s sometimes referred to as an lI application gateway" . 
One of the primary advantages to this approach is minimal 
interference with currently operational simulators . The 
inter connection of the application gateway with the simulator 
is not subject to the DIS standardization effort. A 
reasonable implementation of such a component might be useable 
by various classes of simulators. 
a simulation implementation can span multiple computers , 
either as part of a multiprocessor system , loca l ly 
distributed , or even with geographically distributed 
components . wi th such arrangements, from the vantage point of 
the network , .a single component is designated as representi ng 
the simulation in its entirety. Any information distribution 
among the components is entirely the responsibility of the 
simulator . 
4. PERFORMANCE 
4 . 1 Bandwidth 
There are a 
bandwidth. 
number 
At the 
of factors which have a major influence 
very highest level, they include : 
Total number of entities 
Mixture of entity types 
Type of exercise or scenario 
choice of dead reckoning 
positional/angular thresholds) 
Security requirements 
algorithm 
on DIS 
(and 
For the current set of approved DIS POUs, the majority of network 
traffic will be Entity State POUs (ESPOUs) . ESPOUs are required to 
be sent at some minimum rate (e . g . every 5 seconds) by every entity 
and may be sent much more frequently depending on entity dynamics. 
The start- up of a session will also see high traffic but that is 
deterministic . The POUs used to initialize an exercise or entity 
(such as the recommended Activate POUs) represent a significant 
amount of data to be sent via the net, but they can be transmitted 
at a controlled rate . In the near term, the inclusion of Emitter 
PDUs may add a significant traffic load to the network , depending 
on the degree of electronic warfare (EW) present in a given 
exercise . Similarly the future inclusion of simulated tactical 
communication links (both voice and data) will undoubtedly have a 
substantial impact on bandwidth . 
24 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
In addition to the above there are also additional bandwidth 
requirements due to communications l1overhead l1 • A given POU of li n " 
bits in length requires the addition of both headers and trailers 
in order to satisfy routing and data integrity requirements . The 
proposed UDP/IP protocols add 28 octets (8 for UDP and 20 for IP). 
The underlying media adds fUrther overhead, such as FOOl ' s 20 to 28 
octets of preamble, header and trailer information. A method to 
reduce this load is to concatenate POUs at the application layer 
such that the overhead bits are applied to groups of POUs rather 
than to every POU . This approach, however, imposes an additional 
computational load on each host. This trade- off of processing load 
vs network traffic requires further study before serious 
recommendations can be made. 
Another source of " overhead lt traffic are security measures . The 
degree of overhead depends on at what layer (of the OSI seven layer 
stack) the security measures are implemented . 
4.1.1 Estimating Exercise Bandwidth Requirements. 
In general , there is no single set of formulae for accurately 
estimating the bandwidth requirements of any given DIS exercise 
since, by nature, they have a combination of man- in-the-loop and 
non- deterministic simulated adversaries . As such , each entity in 
a given exercise generates network traffic at a varying rate. The 
rate varies depending on the particular involvement of that entity 
with others . For example , any vehicle that is in transit to or 
from its assigned duty area will exhibit very predictable dynamics 
and therefore generate low network traffic . conversely , an entity 
entering into conflict or close cooperation with another wil l 
typically generate a high leve l of traffic. In both cases the 
traffic is a result of the frequency at which the PDUs are 
generated, while the size of the individual POUs remain relatively 
stable . Estimating sizes of PDUs for selected entity types is a 
comparatively straightforward process, while estimat ing the 
frequency at which they are generated is fairly complex and more 
SUbjective. 
As stated earlier, the Entity State PDU will be the main source of 
network traffic . There are currently nine other PDU types required 
by the DIS standard, with several others recommended. Of the nine 
required , six are related to logistics (e.g. repair and resupply) 
and are expected to occur so infrequently as to have little or no 
effect on network bandwidth requirements. The Collision POU , also 
falls into this category. The Fire POU (FPOU) and Detonation PDU 
(DPDU) , and can conceivably occur frequently enough at certain 
stages of battle to be considered in bandwidth calculations . In 
addition, the Emitter PDU (EPOU), one of the emerging recommended 
messages , is likely to be a major contributor in the near future. 
These four POU types have the following formula for determining 
their sizes (in bits) : 
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PDU FORM!,!LA REMARKS 
ESPDU 11S2+12BA where • I of articulated part 
FPDU 704 records 
DPOU aOO+128H H- # of articulated parts 
hit 
EPDU 192+E(160+B(304+96T» E' I of emitters 
B- # of beams pe r emitter 
T- I of targets per beam 
Given the above, it is possible to estimate the PDQ sizes for 
classes of entity types . For example, for a given type of tank the 
min i mum number of articulated part records may be 5 (azimuth and 
azimuth ra t e for turret , elevation of the barrel, and up/down 
pos i tion for two hatches) and the number of . emitters may be 1 
(laser range finder). For a fighter aircraft t he number of 
art iculated parts could easily be 20 (8 weapon stations , 2 drop 
t a nk stations , 6 v ertica l control surfaces, 2 horizonta l contr o l 
surfaces, l anding gear , and speed brake) with 3 emitters (radar , 
jammer , and laser designator) . Similar assumptions can be made 
regarding surface ships . The following table presents estimates of 
PDU sizing for these three classes of entities (without a ny 
overhead bits) . 
TABLE I. POU Sizing Estimates 
ENTITY CLASS b !l J;; .!l T ~S PDUFPQ!.! DPDU EPDU 
TANK 5 1 1 1 1 1792 704 928 752 
AIRCRAFT 20 2 3 1 2 3712 704 1056 2160 
SURFACE SHIP 50 5 10 1 5 7552 704 1440 9632 
The next step in estimating the bandwidth requirements of a given 
exercise is to approximate the rates at which each entity class 
will issue each of the above POU types. since this rate can vary a 
great deal within a given exercise, one method of estimation is to 
give values representing some average low and high rates . The 
final step is to determine the number of each major entity type 
which will participate in the exercise. Given all of t hese factors, 
the determination of a range of probable network traffic can be 
easily calculated . Figure 7 presents an example of such an 
analysis for three different types of exercises . The examples 
include tactical voice and data links as sources of network traffic 
(65 Kbs fo r each voice channel and actua l values for Link- 4A , 
Link-l l , and Link- l6). Figure 8 presents the results of t he same 
analysis in graphical format . 
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As shown in the figures, the network traffic can vary as much as 
ten to one depending on the relative number of entities which are 
in a high dynamic environment . The low end of the charts are 
certainly the minimum bandwidth requirements since they are based 
on all entities in a quiescent mode (i.e. ESPDUs only once every 5 
seconds) . The high ends of the charts are more subjective since it 
makes assumptions as to the maximum rates each entity type will 
exhibit , but in any case these rates are not probable since they 
represent all entities simultaneously engaged in heavy combat . 
Given those assumptions , such charts may be used as a guide to 
sizing a network for any type of exercise. 
Some f i na l points to be made about the above discussion : 
The sample bandwidth values 
il lustrati on, and should not 
specifications . 
shown are 
be used 
only for 
in formal 
The Emitter POU used here is in accordance with the 
latest format proposed by the Emissions Subgroup, not t he 
format shown in the existing version of the DIS 
specification . This latest version results i n l ess 
overall network traffic since it is only issued on change 
of the emitter data (the older version had to be issued 
at least as often as ESPOUs). 
The analysis does not account for the transi t ory 
existence of entities in the form of guided weapons 
released by various types of weapon systems . These will 
add still further traffic and will most likely be present 
during the same period of time where high vehicle 
dynamics a r e also occurring ; during engagement of groups 
of opposing forces. 
No data compression is assumed . For reduction of POU 
t r affic it is not considered viable at this time due to 
the large computational load it would place upon each 
entity host computer. It should be seriously considered 
for tactical voice links, however , since the task is 
simplified by the fact that the computer does not need to 
know what is actually in a voice message ; the compression 
and decompression can then be done by hardware , exter nal 
to the computer system . The signal can be compressed by 
hardware at the source , sent over the network in its 
compressed form , and fed directly to decompression 
hardware at the listener. A variety of commercial 
devices currently exist to support this, some offering 
time stamping of the audio stream for synchronization . 
Standards are emerging with the growth of multimedia 
computing technology, and could be considered for use in 
the DIS application . 
29 
• 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
4 . 1.2 Estimating Traffic in terms of PDUs and Packets per 
Second. 
Once it has been established that the underlying media is capable 
of handling network traffic (i . e . from the bits per second 
standpoint), the next figure of merit to analyze is that of the 
number of messages to be handled in a given unit of time. This 
factor provides a relative figure - ot- merit for the type of 
processing power necessary for a given set of communications 
protocols . 
Figure 9 presents another look at the sample exercise data 
presented earlier . Here, in addition to the total traffic for each 
exercise in bits per second there are two additional fields showing 
the number of PDUs per second as well as packets per second . The 
following assumptions were made in developing these estimates : 
Packet length is the standard 15 00 octet Ethernet 
datagram size. 
PDUs can be concatenated such that each packet contains 
several PDUs . The POU sizes here are taken to be without 
overhead bits; a single set of overhead bits is appl i ed 
to the entire packet. 
The " host " composing the packets always waits until the 
1500 octet limit is filled . In actua l practice the 
efficiency factor will probably be lower (to avoid 
excessive latency), resulting in an actual packet rate 
that falls somewhere between the two values (PDUs/sec and 
packets/sec) shown . 
Voice packets are produced at 32 Hz , Link- ll and Link- 4A 
at 4 Hz, and Link- 16 (JTIDS) at 16 Hz . 
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5 . SECURITY 
5 .1 Introduction . 
The goa l of this section is to identify a number of security 
requirements made evident by the broad outlines of DIS, and by 
common understanding regarding the environment in which DIS wi ll 
perform . The sect ion will also give a thumbnail sketch of the 
world of information security . This section is not intended t o be 
a comprehensive analys i s of DIS security requirements . Such 
requirements will be a complex function of t he syst em itself as it 
evolves , a nd of the needs of its primary intended users . 
5 . 2 Policy . 
As Automated Information Sy s t ems (AlS) , netwo rks supporting DIS 
must c omply with appropriate security criteria to be certified and 
accredited to process unclassified sensitive and classified 
information. The criteria encompass a wide range of security 
issues that impact the AIS or network . Security is usually 
ach ieved by a combination of software and h a rdware functions , 
administrative procedures , personnel clearances , and physical 
measures . The Designated Approving Authority (DAA) determines the 
r e quired bal ance of automated functions and manua l procedures in 
accordance with risk management decisions . 
AIS security i s an operationa l r equi r ement and requires detai l ed 
p l anning and execution t o a degree equal to or greater than any 
other oper ational r equ irement . Security shall be considered 
throughout the life cycle of an AIS network from the beginning of 
concept development, through design, development, operation, and 
ma intenance . The program manager and system developer mus t t ake 
steps to ensure that security c onsiderat ions are addressed in each 
of the above r efer enced phases of the system life cyc l e . 
5 .2.1 security Pl an . 
security Plans for DIS networks will be based on guidance from 
appropriate 000 Component Heads . Security plans shal l be prepared 
by the appropriate In fo r mation System Security Organization (ISSO) 
or Network Security Officer (NSO) 
5 . 3 Security Vocabulary . 
Arguably the most important t ask in def ining a security 
specification for DIS is the acceptance of a common vocabulary for 
discussing security issues . The most widely a ccepted system so fa r 
d e veloped is the 000 Trusted Computer Sy stems Evaluation criter ia 
(TCSEC) , and its follow- on II interpre tations " for Networking , Secu re 
Database standards , and I ntegrity Criteria . TCSEC is a lso known as 
the Orange Book , while the Trusted Network Interpre t a tion (TNI) i s 
known as the Red Book . These works have both popularized and made 
explicit such terms as "Security Policy ", I1 Multilevel Secur i tyll, 
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" Discretionary Access Control II , "Trust ed Path" , etc . , as we ll as 
the familiar rating categories CI , C2, BI, B2 . B3 , Al. 
The National Computer Security Center (NCSC) evaluates commercial 
products . 
There are many good reasons for using the DoD security vocabulary. 
For o ne thing, it is fairly explicit , and addresses virtually every 
conceivable aspect o f computer security. It is not necessary to 
commit to the evaluation cat egor i es o r specific formulas of risk 
assessment to b e nefit from the vocabulary , conce pts, and 
methodologies which h ave been developed . In addition, the primary 
clients for DIS will initially come from the 000, and the 
classified nature of informatio n exchanged on distributed 
simulation nets makes the DoD security vocabulary appropriate . 
5.4 DIS Security Requ irement s . 
A c ompr e h ens ive li s t of DIS security requirements i s n o t available , 
nor is there one in preparation. Yet certain specific secur ity 
needs are a lready discernible . It i s the responsibility of the 
network sponsor to describe the o verall network security policy 
enforced by the Network Trusted Computing Base (NTCB). At a 
minimum, this policy shall include the d isc r e tiona ry a nd mandatory 
integrity, or both. The policy may r equire data secrecy , or data 
i ntegrity , or both . It i s essential that development of t he 
discretionary and mandat ory secrecy policy be addressed as an 
integra l part of n e twork design . Some of the elements that support 
the security policy are described briefly in the rema inder of this 
section. The e l ements are merely examples; development of a 
security policy and security appliques for specifi c DIS applica tion 
requires support from information security specialist within a 
given organization or comma nd and may also require support from 
INFOSEC spec i alist from the National Security Agency ' s (NSA) 
Information Systems Security Organ ization . 
5 .4 . 1 Encryption 
5 . 4 . 1 . 1 Confidentiality Requirements. 
It i s knovm that messages exchanged during a military simulation 
will contai n sensitive data regarding weapons systems 
characteristics and warfare t actics . A DIS exer c i s e may a lso be the 
rehearsal of an oper a t ional mission , and as such the data exchanged 
will be ext r emely sensitive . Clearly such informa tion mus t be 
protected from eavesdropping by simulation n on- participants, much 
in the same manner as t elemetry data is protected . Eavesdropping 
c a n occur via wiretapping, which is monitoring by entities not 
l egitimately connect ed to the net , or by users who are legitimatel y 
connected but are accessing message data not intended or them . 
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A mechanism for thwarting eavesdroppers is encryption of messages 
on the network. The architectural level a t which 
encryption/decryption occurs is signi ficant: encryption a t the l ink 
level (L2) is more efficient , while encryption at the session layer 
or higher (L5+) allows users to be differentiated by different 
encryption keys, and protects messages for a greater part of their 
passage through the operating system of the host . Encryption is 
used for other tasks as well , in particular, the authentication of 
user identities . Identification and authentication are covered in 
section 5.4.3 below. 
5 . 4.1.2 Key Distribution . 
Assigning and distributing cryptographic keys on a dynamic or 
per- session basis can be a major difficulty . However, the Joint 
Chiefs Of Staff (JCS) issued a Mu lticommand Required Operationa l 
capability (HROC) for a Joint Key Management System (JKMS) on 28 
December 1989 . Further, the criticality of inte roperabil ity 
through electronic key distribution was underscored by joint 
operations in DESERT STORM, and consequently enjoys a high 
priority . When fielded , electronic key management will eliminate 
the requirement to physically deliver ke ying material to each DIS 
facility. Products such as CANEWARE and NEW are a l ready capable of 
accepting electronically distributed key. 
It h as not been confirmed if JKMS is avai lable for use with DIS 
appl ications . Reguardless, any use of e ncryption keys will be 
implementation dependent and will be specified by the exercise 
organizer . 
5 . 4.1.3 DIS Encryption. 
Nodes on a DIS n etwork will not transmit a great deal of data, but 
will receive data from al l the other nodes in the simulation. Thus 
a fast algorithm is required t if only on the decoding end . 
Fiber Data Distribution Interface (FOOl) fiber optics are 
relatively safe from wiretapping, so the need for encryption on a 
FOOl ring is reduced on a LAN if its configuration meets the 
criteria of a protected distribution system (PDS). Encryption may 
be required on a LAN supporting multilevel security to prevent 
eavesdropping by legitimately connected FOOl hosts; like wise there 
is an eventual n eed for session level isolation and access control 
in multi - user application gateways. \'lANs employing FDDI will 
require encryption due to the wiretap threat . At present, 
encryption systems for the 100Mb plus data rates are under 
development but not currently available . Fortunately , in the short 
term , only single simulations will run on the DIS net t and 
nonparticipants can be physically excluded; thus link level 
encryption for FOOl can await the emergence of a suitably fast 
technology . 
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5.4.2 Access Control Issues. 
DIS will support multiple simulations simultaneously on a single 
network . Enforcing the separation of simulations becomes a 
security issue when differing classification levels coexist , as , 
for example, when a highly classified weapons devel opment 
simulation is run together with a simulated battle scenario, 
presumably at a lower classification level . 
DIS security issues go far beyond the protection of r un- time 
simulation messages . Computers that participate in more than one 
level of exercise will be required to store and to int ernal ly 
manipulate data of varying classifications , and to insure t hat only 
users with proper clearance can access classified data . This 
raises issues of Multilevel Security at both the Operating System 
and Database levels . The following sections discuss these issues 
in more detail . 
5 . 4 . 2.1 Label-based Access Control Mechanisms. 
Label - based security is an important requirement in the DoD TCSEC 
at the Bl and high er levels of assurance . The mechanisms are 
called Mandatory Access Controls (MAC) because data transfer is 
governed , in part , by the contents of subject and object 
sensitiv i ty labels . 
Multilevel Security is implemented by defining a class of protected 
data objects , and attaching security sens i tivity labels to them. 
Autonomous entities (users and pro c e sses) are known as subjects i 
these also receive sensitivity labels by which their access to the 
protected obj e cts is regulated . The set of subjects and objects , 
together with the rules for access, is carefully specified in a set 
of rules. The enforcement mechanism for the rules is referred to 
as the Reference Honitor . 
The Bell - Lapadula Model is a Security Policy associated with the 
TCSEC . It specifies important read and write controls so that 
classified information cannot flow in violation of nationa l 
security directives. The Bell - LaPadula model is the most widely 
accepted and implemented access control model used in the DoD. 
5 . 4.3 Identity and Authentication. 
In a distributed interactive simulation, it is important to 
guarantee that participants are, in fact, who they say they are; 
this is known as the Authentication Problem . Identification of 
entities can occur at varying levels of granularity : the l evel of 
host on a network , the level of human users on the network , or the 
identifications of individual processes . In the init ial DIS 
environment, simulation hosts will participate in only one 
simUlation at a time; it seems reasonable , therefore, to initially 
propose a per-node granularity of authentication. 
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5.4.4 Integrity. 
In DIS, as in most environments, there is the need to insure that 
data is not corrupted, either deliberately or by accident. This 
issue of Integrity is an important security problem, and applies to 
message data, stored information, and dynamically manipul ated 
information within an operating system. Again , cryptography plays 
an important r o le in data integrity verification (for exampl e by 
checksums), and many network authentication services also support 
point- to- point integrity policies. 
5 .4 . 5 Audit . 
A critical facility for all secure systems (including networks) is 
the audit facility. The audit facility maintains logs of 
security-relevant events in tamperproof, restricted access 
locations; typical examples of logged events include attempted 
logins and access to critical data . Commercial audi t products 
exist. 
Audit trails can be maintained on individual systems, but a network 
audit facility is also desirable in DIS. Coordinating a 
distributed audit facility can be a problem , and might require 
utilities like NFS and yellow pages (secure versions of which are 
currently under development) . The main problem with audit is 
storing and analyzing the enormous amount of data that can be 
generated. The primary approach to this problem is to specify a 
limi t ed set of audit events; th is greatly reduces the da t a volume. 
Many audit systems will have built in " triggers ", or thresholds , 
that expand the level of audit detail in areas where certain 
conditions have been exceeded . Likewise, there are processing 
tools to make the analysis of audit data easier, should that prove 
necessary. 
5 . 4.6 Security Architecture. 
Approaches to network security are dictated by a number of factors, 
such as data rates, vulner ability , threat and availability of 
encryption devices . The DIS Security Models section (Section 5.6) 
describes a security framework and security architectures that are 
usable and compatible with the DIS architecture. 
5 . 4 . 7 Physical Security . 
Physical security consists of functions that can be 
" physical II mechanisms , i. e . I those that are not 
computer operating system . A list of examples might 
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1) Protected cables, locked rooms, security guards , removable 
media 
2) computer locks , disk drive locks, hardening against radiation 
leakage & radiation damage 
Physical security can 
fiber - optic networks. 
undetected, 2) immune 
can be monitored. 
corne from unexpected sources I for example 
Fiber optic networks 1) are difficult to tap 
to EMR damage , and 3) do not leak EMR that 
In general, however , the methods of physical security lie outside 
our scope of interest . 
5 . 5 security Products . 
A list of certified network products can be found in the 
Information Systems Security Products and Services Catalogue , 
published by the NSA . Additional information in Information 
Systems Security products and services may be obtained by writing 
to: 
Director 
National Security Agency 
ATTN : INFOSEC Office of customer Relations 
Fort George G. Meade , MD 20755-6000 
or calling : 
Customer Relations at (301}688 - 4680 . 
5 . 6 DIS Security Models ( to be added) 
5 . 6 . 1 Case 1: Single Cell - System High 
5 . 6 . 2 Case 2 : Multiple cells - Same security Level 
5.6.3 Case 3: Multiple Cells - Different Security Levels 
5.7 Conclusion. 
The secur ity situation for DIS is complicated by the des ire for 
standards and interoper ability, a real dearth of avai lable 
products , and the inherent vulnerabilities of a distributed 
architecture. Implementers of critical features , such as 
networking, operating systems , and database security, wi ll have to 
confront major syst ems integration and standards - conformance 
problems . At the same time, the classified environments in which 
DIS must operate will make adherence to formal standards of 
eva luat ion and certification more critical than in commercial 
e nvironments . 
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6 . NETWORK MANAGEMENT 
6.1 Network Management. 
The appr oach to network management is usua lly dependen t upon t he 
type of net work employed . Thus I the generally recognized and 
sanctioned way to manage an OSI - based network is in the form o f OSI 
n etwork management protocols and service definitions . Similarly , 
an I nternet based network is typically managed by I nternet net work 
management protocols . The most prudent course of action would be 
to adopt t he network management approach that comes with t he 
protocol suite selected fo r handling interoperabi l ity . 
6 .1.1 Basic Functions . 
Exer c i se c ommunications management is a set of fac il i t ies to 
monitor and contro l the networks that join simul a t ors and other DIS 
component s a t a site and sites with each o t her. Monitoring shall 
mean the abi lity to de t ermine the status of a network compone nt. 
Control shall mean the ability to set parameters of a network 
component . The monitoring and control of network components i s 
often referred to as " network management". 
DIS requi r ements for network management are essentia l ly the same as 
fo r any o ther distribut ed application . One can t hink of a n 
exercise as having t wo phases , initializat i on and oper a tion . 
· During the init ia l ization phase , o ne would u se net work managemen t 
monitori ng facilit i es t o check the status of l ines , host 
interfaces , routers, and other network components r equired fo r the 
exercise . Control functions would be used to boot devices with the 
appropriate parameter s, enable interfaces, and so on . The exact 
set of functions used would depend on the equipment being used , the 
extent to which its configuration can be changed, and the nature of 
the network or networks involved . 
During operation of an exercise, network management funct i ons would 
be used to detect and troubleshoot problems . Monitoring functions 
are used to detect appa r ent connectivity o r equipment failures . 
Once a problem is detected , operators select appropriate moni t ori ng 
functions to retrieve parameter values or other information needed 
to determine the exact cause. Finally , operators can use cont rol 
functions to reboot equipment , activate alternate interfaces , or 
take other cor rective action . As is the case for initia l izat i on , 
the exact fu nctions used would depend on the nature of the problem , 
the equipment, and of the networks involved . 
It should be noted that some facets of network operation are not 
typically automated or performed remotely. For example , a network 
operator mi ght command the use of a dial - up line, but the use of 
l eased lines must typical l y be arranged for in advance . Al so, 
while a network operator might command the use of back- up equipment 
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when primary equipment fails, it is sometimes necessary for a 
technician to remove and replace failed components. 
6 . 1.2 Network Management Architecture 
DIS shall use standard network management protocols to manage the 
communications infrastructure . Simple Network Management Protocol 
(SNMP) is a network management protocol frequently used in 
conjunction with the Transmission Control Protocol (TeP)/Internet 
Protocol (IP) stack . Common Management Information Services 
(CMIS)/Cornmon Management Information Protocol (eM!p) is used in an 
OS1 environment. The choice of network management protocol would 
depend on the other protocol suites (i.e. Internet or aS!) being 
used in the network. 
With the phased migration from UDP/1P to OS1 recommended by CASS, 
the choice of Network Management protocol would intuitivel y 
progress from SNMP to CMIS/CMIP. Some of the respective 
architectural features are listed below . 
In the SNMP architecture , there are a number of Network Management 
Stations (NMS ' s) which gather pertinent information by 
communicating with Management Agents associated with each Network 
Element such as hosts, terminal servers, and gateways . 
SNMP ' s support seems to be widespread and growing. There are , 
however , some perceived limitations 
1. Poor communications between SNMP Network Management 
Stations . 
2 . There are 
authentication 
security weaknesses, 
of Set commands . 
such as the lack of 
3. SNMP does not handle sub- element addressing. For example , 
to get at info about port #5 of a multi-port router, the net 
manager must go through a long process of repeatedly querying 
data for every instance of a variable 
Work is currently ongoing to correct these problems . A proposal to 
help resolve this problem will include block transfers of MIB data. 
The proposed revision will be called $MP . 
Problems which must be addressed are information hiding ; for 
securi ty reasons, not all network management systems should be 
allowed access to the complete MIS of all elements . 
CMIP, like OS1 in general, is not widely supported and, in fact , 
not totally proven. One criticism is that it uses all 7 layers of 
the OS1 stack and consumes too much processing power. To cut the 
processing requirement, CHOP and CMOL operate over Tep/IP and link 
level respectively . These protocols are not necessarily 
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OSI - cornpliant and are not widely supported . On the positive side , 
SNMP wil l run over as! networks . 
6 . 2 Network Management Functions 
The fol l owing sections are functions that shoul d be provided by 
Network Management. Concern was given that these functions will 
al l be impacted by the decision on whether securi ty i s managed on 
a " cel l I! basis where all physical simulators and simulators are 
statically bound , or managed on a conceptual " exercise" basis . 
6.2 .1 Define or choose mechanism to promulgate security level of 
exercise . 
I ssues fo r this funct i on are : 
1 . Wha t is t he system ' s security latt ice , i .e ., wha t a r e t he 
values of the security sensitivity labels that could l egally 
be associated with any data in the exer c i se , and what a r e t he 
dominance relationships when comparing any two wit h each 
other? 
2 . What is the granularity of security sensitivity l abel ing? 
6 . 2 . 2 Define the mapping between classified a nd unclassified 
databases . 
Issues for this function are : 
1 . What is the granularity 
the database , e . g ., 
record - level? 
of security sensitivity 
none; table- level ; 
labeling of 
row- level; 
2. Who is to have access to the classified and unclassified 
tables? 
3 . What are the clearance levels of those who are to have 
access to the tables? 
6 . 2 . 3 Enumerate all hosts participating in the exercise . 
Issues for this function are : 
1 . What is the security operating mode of the host? 
2 . Hhat is the security lattice subset supported by the host? 
3 . What are the security characteristics associated with 
hosts with which any given host wishes to communicate? 
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6 .2.3.1 Enumerate security sensitivity level of all participating 
hosts (in the exercise) . 
6 .2.4 Provide a mechanism to select & distribute keying material 
as needed . 
Security issues for this function are : 
1 . Centralized or distributed? 
2. Manual or automated? 
3. If automated, accredited? 
4. What is the security policy regarding key distribution and 
change? 
6.2 . 5 Choose address or addresses to be used in exercise 
Shoul d the security characteristics (security operating mode, 
maximum security l eve l ) of an addressee be supplied with the 
address? 
6.2.6 Allocate bandwidth appropriately 
The philosophical design permits simulators 
an exercise which may l ast for several days . 
arise : 
to come and go during 
The followin g issues 
1. What bandwidth is reserved in advance? 
2 . How are simulators admitted into an exercise with a high 
degree of confidence that performance will remain acceptabl e? 
Does the exercise management function include mechanisms for 
honoring or rejecting a request to enter ? 
Are there run - time provisions for sensing cases in which one 
network element is " hogging " the medium? It might be difficul t to 
call a break to hunt down such a problem . 
6.2.7 Use network time protocol (NTP) rather than new PDU ' s for 
time 
Issues for the following function are : 
1 . On a dynamic network such as this , could an NTP-base 
synchronization subnet be properly designed ? 
2 . Considering the sizable investments at most training sites 
and the fact that PC and VME- based GPS receivers can be 
purchased for $5K , might it be better to sync each site to GPS 
? If each site has a GPS receiver, should NTP be used on the 
LAN? In a LAN, the time server simply broadcasts . 
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3 . The NTP time stamp uses 64 - bit fixed-point timestamp with 
integer in first 32 - bits and fraction in next 32 bits . Is this 
appropriate for all the various entities including field 
instrumentation entities? 
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10 Commun i cation Architecture Profile For Phase Q 
The following i s one example of how a communications profile might 
set up for a DIS exercise . This communication architecture uses 
the 000 family of protocols is based on IP, with TCP (MIL- STD- 1778) 
for reliable commun ication and UDP for r ea l - time communication . 
10 . 1 Exercise Ma nagement . In each simulation site there are 
several simulators a nd a Local Exercise Ma nager (LEM) , all 
interconnected by aLAN, t o which we refer as " Ethernet" I even 
t hough it may be FOOl o r other LANs. 
The LEM is a software module , which does not n eed dedicated 
hardware , and may be implement ed on allY of the simulators, for 
example . The LEM is in communication with other LEMs , part i cularly 
with the Gl oba l Exercise Manager (GEM) for the purpose of 
coordinati ng the entire exercise . 
After the LEMs agr ee about the paramet e r s of an exercise the y 
communicate them to all the participating simulators , using a 
" session- lev e l " type communication. This setup inc ludes the 
ide ntifications of all the simulators involved in the exercise, 
their roles , the exact p r esentation schemes to be used , the exact 
geographic database to be used , t he maximal bandwidth that each 
simulator is allowed to load o n the n e twork, a nd the 
IP-multicast- addresses (IPMCA) assigned to the entire exercise . 
10 .2 Commu n ication Setup . The setup commun ication between the 
LEM and the simulators is c onduct ed by using Telnet over TCP (over 
IP, ov er Ethernet) . The setup process may use both manual a nd 
automatic procedures . As a part of the general setup , database 
files (e .g. , geographic) are l oaded f rom designated directories by 
using FTP . FTP also operates over TCP (over IP, over the 
Ethernet) . The real-time communication (e.g . , of POUs) is carried 
by UOP . These packets are encapsulated inside Etherne t packets . 
The ent ire configuration is managed (and verified) by using SNMP i n 
the simulators . This a llows a remote network management process to 
check the status of each simulator. 
In each case the rea l - time simulation messages are sent t o all 
the participants i n the exercise, loca l broadcast over the 
Ethernet , a nd remote mul ticast over WANs. 
It is expected that future simulators may r equire time 
synchronization . This may be achieved by using the Internet time 
synchronization pro t ocol (a . k . a . the Network Time Protocol , NTP), 
over UDP, on the Ethernet. The time protocol is defined in RFCll19 
and RFC 1129 . 
The real - time communication f or the support of distributed 
interactiv e s imulation requires that a given bandwidth is delivered 
without exceeding a given delay. In practice this required both 
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multicast and bandwidth performance guarantees. Since t hese issues 
(bandwidth+delay and multicast) are at the network level (level - 3 
of t he ISORM) it is possible to address them a t the gateway between 
the LAN and the WAN . If the WAN provide these services t her e i s no 
need for t h is gateway to be involved . However , i n the most g e ne r a l 
case this gateway should handle them . In cases that the Commercia l 
Off The Shelf (COTS) gateways and WANs do not provide this 
functionality I it can be achieved by adding a front - end to the 
gateway on a general purpose comput er , preferably with two Ethernet 
interfaces to allow inser ting this front - end " in series " with t he 
gateway. 
To guarantee ihteroperability , each simulator should compl y 
with the Host- Requirement , as specified in "Requirements for 
Internet hosts communication layers " (RFCl 1 2 2) and i n 
"Requirements for Internet hosts appl ication and s upport !! 
(RFC l 123) . This would guarantee the " invisible support II as 
required for interoperability (including ARP, re- di r ect , etc . ) . A 
good source of information is "Perspective on the Host Requirements 
RFCs " (RFCl127) . 
+------------+ +--------+ [ Simulation [ [Setup [ 
+------+ +-----+ +------------+ +--------+ +-----+ +-------+ 
[ SNMP [ [NTP [ [Presentat i on[ [Telnet I I FTP I I Email I 
+------+--+-----+--+------------+ +--------+--+-----+--+-------+ 
IUD P : i T C P I 
+-------------------------------+--+----------------------------+ 
: I P I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ [ E THE R NET I 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ I 500hm coax [ 
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ 
Figure 10. The Protocol structure in the Simul ators 
Notes: 
* The ISORM level of the Ethernet is 2, of IF is 3 , and of TCP 
and UDP is 4 . The ISO level of the simulation is 7 , and its 
presentation level is 6 . 
* The simulation session level, 5, does not show explicit ly . 
* Each of Telnet and FTP span levels 5 through 7. 
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